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Evaluating the impact of NextGen’s air traffic
system on aviation security
LVWeiland*, and GWei
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, USA
Abstract. Networked Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen) opened the gate to digital National Airspace System (NAS) in
cyberspace. Air traffic improvements from NextGen system, accompanied
by the risk of long-standing cyberattack issue in information technology
industry became an increasingly challenging matter to the aviation
community and Air Traffic Management (ATM), as cybersecurity
challenges in the NextGen system could affect NextGen's principle
assurance of safety and security in air transportation. The technological
shift of NAS infrastructure from traditional radar-based systems to
networking system of systems leads to a review, revision and redefinition
of current policies, standards regelations, cultures and norm to reflect and
mitigate new risks. Through analysing reports, regulations, standards,
practices, recommendations from government and industry, the researchers
analyse security impacts to NextGen; the risk of a cybersecurity incidents;
and regulations to identify most effective and efficient control measures
over information systems in ATM, and direction to further research.
1 Introduction
A question raised from incidents is, how do we prevent cyber-attacks in ATM? Before
looking for the answer, another question should be answered first. What have we done to
prevent cyber-attacks in ATM? NextGen information systems (IS), not only creates billions
dollars in economic value and millions of job opportunities like other industries [1], but it
also has distinctive and immediate impact on the NAS security and public safety, as it
provides safe and accurate air communication in a complex environment. Upgrade to
network-based IS in aviation concerns security, safety, aircraft design research, aviation
regulations, and training certification in both government and private sectors.
Understanding development status, limitations, and responsibilities of each part will better
position aviation for approaching aviation cybersecurity.
2 NextGen in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS)
2.1 Network Construction
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Interconnections of physical components using network technology, Information Systems
(IS), hardware and software created a NextGen net-centricity environment to share
aeronautical data “timely and seamlessly among users, applications, and platforms” [2].
Based on FAA official website data, information from FAA Telecommunications
Infrastructure (FTI) Overview [3, 4, &5], the fundamental infrastructure enabling net




U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) [2] described cyberattacks as “evolving,
growing”, “intentional or unintentional” (p. 1), and cyber-based or physically damaging
adversaries against NextGen system with various sources. Testimonies [6, 7] further
revealed that criminal groups, hackers, insiders, other nations, and terrorists had been the
primary actors of cyber threat based on government and nongovernment data. Leaders of
National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) and American Association of Airport
Executives (AAAE) stated insiders’ threat was the biggest issue of cybersecurity [8].
2.2.2 Methods
GAO report [6] and testimony [7] also revealed more than 20 methods and exploits of
cyberattacks commonly used against federal systems, and among some of them were
uncommonly known to the public. For example, creating fake wireless internet access point
in public, such as coffee shops, to collect information of victims frequently visited websites,
and injected malware to websites to attack targets (watering hole), driving in targeted areas
with wireless capability equipped computers to search for unsecured network (war driving),
or transmitting more data than system could handle resulting in deletion of data or
execution of malware (buffer overflow). Based on target of the attack, threats can be
classified as direct, indirect, and human.
2.2.3 Science of modern communication
The core of NextGen is the integration of numerous NAS IS platforms using digital
communication technology wirelessly or wired. Wireless communication IS, such as Data
Comm, SBSS, AatS, and ACARS transmits on-and-off electrical signal using modulated
radio wave or microwave at a frequency ranging from 30 MHz to 3000GHz within
electromagnetic (EM) spectrum [8, 9]. The client is an application or interface allowing
users to access servers to create, change or delete data. Some client interfaces allow users to
make a critical change to the IS depending on protocol and level of authorization. In the
context of NextGen IS, which consist of both wired and wireless network channels in many
physical facilities such as airports, ATC towers, ground stations, and air routes in space,
access to encrypted and modulated signals from authorized or unauthorized devices,
systems or computers could be everywhere.
2.2.4 Culture artifacts
Motivations behind unauthorized access to NextGen IS varies. Not understanding these
motivations resulting in "prematurely reactive" threat response [10]. State-sponsored
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context of NextGen IS, which consist of both wired and wireless network channels in many
physical facilities such as airports, ATC towers, ground stations, and air routes in space,
access to encrypted and modulated signals from authorized or unauthorized devices,
systems or computers could be everywhere.
2.2.4 Culture artifacts
Motivations behind unauthorized access to NextGen IS varies. Not understanding these
motivations resulting in "prematurely reactive" threat response [10]. State-sponsored
attacks and terrorist attacks call for immediate actions of both private and government
efforts with thorough preparation, while random phishing emails could be mitigated
through in-house training, education, and continuous monitor. Motivations of threat actors
could be divided into 6 categories: curiosity, revenge, revelation, espionage, destruction,
and money.
2.2.5 NextGen cyber issues
GAO report [5] stated FAA heavily relied on a huge network of hardware, software, and
communication equipment including over 100 different systems to function properly. The
agency showed weaknesses in user access control to its systems, control of network system,
software and device change and update, uncompleted agency-wide information security
program required by Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, improper
governance structure and practice in accordance with National Institute of Standards and
Technology guidance (NIST), and ineffective response to and detection of cyber issue.
Another GAO report [4] revealed that both FAA and security experts acknowledged
avionics systems onboard aircraft could be accessed and planted in with virus or malware
from inside and outside of the airplane through in-flight Internet Protocol (IP) based
network; and FAA accepted security control of NextGen system provided by its contractors
without evaluation and oversight on the matter. Another research showed that SBSS
network was also subject to the same cyber threats [11]. Furthermore, ADS-series, ADS-
based systems such as CPDLC, WAM, TCAS, FIS-B, TIS-B, radar-based navigation aids
systems such as PSR, SSR, GPS, VHF VOR, ILS, NDB and DME, are subject to jamming
denial of service, spoofing, and authentication issue [12]. Though impact on confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of aeronautic information due to technology or systemic
vulnerability could be minor, however, the aviation industry is subject to another more
severe threat: human aspect.
3 Government
3.1 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 41
3.1.1 Summary
Former Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 41 on 26 July, 2016 to form the
Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG) to handle significant cyber incidents which were
“likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or
economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health
and safety of the American people” [13]. The three agencies will coordinate closely to
detect, protect and recover from significant cyber incidents involving federal government
system unless such incidents affect private entities, in which case, the relevant sector-
specific agencies would coordinate federal government recourse to determine response
action [12].
3.2 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and cybersecurity
3.2.1 Organizational
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Under current FAA structure, five offices and one committee would be responsible for
cybersecurity [4]. GAO [4] discovered cybersecurity responsibilities within the agency
were not clearly identified and clarified. Additionally, the FAA did not fulfil its external
cybersecurity responsibilities established by Department of Transportation (DOT) [14].
Despite this requirement, DOT was not aware of any cyber incidents which FAA reported
directly to DHS since the deployment of NextGen; and it did not have access to NextGen
air transportation information, or receive any request from the FAA to change or monitor
the system; critically, DOT discovered issue of partially monitoring of NAS which was
previously identified by GAO in early 2015 [14]; [4]. The increasing demand for
cybersecurity, which would play a determining role in maintaining continuity of NextGen
operation, inside FAA could affect its performance. FAA has been relying on its inspectors
and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to provide safety guidance and
regulation over civil aviation in the physical world. Reports from the GAO and DOT
provided evidence to show FAA could only observe cybersecurity matters in its traditional
safety mind set not from a security perspective.
4 Cybersecurity vs safety culture
As governing body of aviation and safety, FAA [1] has been emphasizing the foster of
positive safety culture (PSC). However, does PSC effectively help FAA to address
challenges of cybersecurity? PSC has five aspects of culture: informed, reporting, just,
learning, and flexible [15]. Informed culture addresses IS administrators as having
knowledge of system/s in various aspect to determine safety readiness; and reporting
culture refers to people’ readiness in an organization to report incident or accidents. FAA
has failed on these two aspects both externally and internally [14]. Poor reporting culture
resulted in poorly informed culture. Years of partial system monitor show the lack of
practical cybersecurity guidelines. During the audit OIG saw a mitigation plan developed.
The audit report showed FAA’s lack of just culture, with an atmosphere that did not lead to
people understanding the difference between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour and
the promotion of acceptable behaviour. The FAA failed to develop a required Plan of
Action and Milestone (POA&M) as per DOT Cybersecurity Compendium to resolve 273
cybersecurity incidents [16]. The FAA has a learning culture, an organizational climate that
encourages continuous improvement, but was not evident in its response to the known
issues as it was found to repeat some of the same cyber issues [4; 5; 14]. Good learning
culture not only includes active response to knowns issues but also embraces proactive
effort to improve the system as a whole. Flexibility culture in FAA was positive as the
agency allocated multidepartment's resource to confront challenges, for example, creating
ARAC to address NextGen cybersecurity. At this point, FAA’s actions, and behaviours did
not “demonstrate a commitment to safety over competing goals and demand” [1, p 11].
However, drawing the conclusion of positive safety culture in the context of cybersecurity
during the development of the cyber system is premature as the foster of culture takes time,
especially, in the case when established cultural experience has a challenge of new risks.
5 Airline and airport cyber development
Before NextGen network-based IS has been in place in airports and airlines. Thus, they
both have some levels of cybersecurity ownership. How each develops future information
technology (IT) will affect integrity and security of NextGen systems as airports provide
critical and physical entrant to the NAS.
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5.1 Airlines
SITA [17], a major worldwide telecommunication and IT service provider to air
transportation industry, has been conducting annual airline IT trends for years. Its latest
report revealed airline fleet aircraft have and will continue to become more connected with
internet using new systems. In cybersecurity, more airline board-level executives and
management are assuming responsibility. About 25% of airlines were prepared for cyberattack and
70% airlines had strengthened cybersecurity education and training. These data were based on a
survey of the 200 top airlines worldwide of which 14% represented airline from the Americas [17].
5.2 Airports
SITA also followed airports and investment in PED based service such as a mobile
purchase at an airport and saw increases of service needed [18]. Airports also began to
implement IT, for example, cloud services and sensors to improve operation efficiency.
However, more than 40% of airports were still developing cybersecurity strategy, and only
19% were prepared for a cyber-attack [18].
5.3 Report Analysis
Both reports provided IT development trends in the global market. It did not provide
specific details of US airlines and airports. Additionally, though airlines showed support for
cybersecurity training and educations, evaluations of cybersecurity efficiency were not
present. Effective cyber training and education alone will not guarantee effective
cybersecurity measures, but would move towards hardening the systems. Also, resources to
invest in IT and develop cybersecurity strategy varies among airlines and airports
depending on finance and skills the organizations possess, resulting in a different level of
understanding and preparedness of cybersecurity [17;18].
6 Challenges
This research identified multiple challenges. First, FAA’s lack of effectiveness and
efficiency in addressing aviation safety due to cyber issues to fulfil its responsibilities
during NextGen's implementation in long term. Before the intention and method of attack
could be determined by DHS, as directed by PPD-41, FAA was not being able to identify
the cause of an issue, nor direction to approach solution while other aircraft having the
same design would remain under risk. Second, is the increasing dependence on integrated
and automated IS requiring FAA to monitor and maintain NextGen. For example,
malfunction or replacement of SBSS components. Comparing automobiles relying on GPS
for navigation on an interstate highway where separation is small, any GPS malfunction
could result in automobile crashes, and the risk would be high. The third challenge,
shortage of cybersecurity talents. As the aviation industry would become more and more
connected with internet, it would demand investment in cybersecurity. Morgan [19]
estimates the US shortage of cybersecurity employees in the thousands. The fourth was
effective monitoring and intelligence collection for positive cybersecurity without intruding
privacy. Cybersecurity would necessitate a large amount of monitoring, such as monitoring
employees to comply with policies, IS configuration, internet usages, and passengers'
behaviours, and collecting personal information from the internet to determine a level of
risk. Privacy would become a more sensitive matter as consumers are exposed more to the
internet. The fifth was cybersecurity requirement without regulation for airports and airlines.
Airports and airlines have approached cybersecurity differently based on their own
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situations. Cyber-attacks occur at weaknesses which have the least amount of difficulty and
resistance. Once one system is compromised, other systems are potential victims. Thus,
airlines and airports have shared cyber risk and cyber responsibility. However, lack of
regulations would result in different approaches and standards. Last, the growing numbers
and evolving techniques of cyber-attacks from various sources. Continuous investment,
education, training, and learning is required; however, the outcome of such effort is not
promising in a complex environment consisting of both cyber and physical worlds.
7 Recommendations
7.1 Countermeasure redefined
Understanding of issues and identification of challenges would better prepare the airline
industry for developing solutions that would encompass conceptual ideas of objectives and
methods. The word cybersecurity has been used commonly on the internet as a
countermeasure against cyber-attacks and cyber threats. Federal government defined
cybersecurity as: Strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in
cyberspace, and encompasses the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction,
deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies
and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law
enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security
and stability of the global information and communications infrastructure [20]. This
definition manifests every aspect of actions and activities related to cybersecurity which
could apply to the aviation industry on an organizational scale instead of global
infrastructure scale.
7.1.1 Approach
Different activities have a different level of impact on cybersecurity. Proactive activities
such as threat and vulnerability reduction would lead to a direct positive outcome, while the
effect of incident response and recovery policies would not be seen until an incident occurs,
and it improves an organizations' experience. This difference of impact causes
organizations to emphasize policies and activities deemed to be effective based on their
knowledge, skills, resources, risk, and priority.
7.1.2 Holistic
Keanini, Chief Technology Officer of Lancope Inc, network security analytic service
provider owned by American networking hardware company Cisco, said holistic approach
was based on decision-making theory of OODA Loop [21], created by military strategist
and former U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd. The holistic approach is a comprehensive
and continuous process to address cybersecurity by using OODA loop consisting of
observation, orientation, decision, and action. The holistic approach calls for operating
OODA loop at faster pace continuously than threat actors to increase resistance to threat
and raise expenses for threat actors while strengthening cybersecurity. NIST and other
security experts also recognized that this approach would allow an organization to develop
a comprehensive understanding of threats against IS and level of risk [4]; however, they
acknowledged this approach is “costly and time-consuming” (p. 17).
6
MATEC Web of Conferences 189, 10030 (2018)  https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201818910030
MEAMT 2018
situations. Cyber-attacks occur at weaknesses which have the least amount of difficulty and
resistance. Once one system is compromised, other systems are potential victims. Thus,
airlines and airports have shared cyber risk and cyber responsibility. However, lack of
regulations would result in different approaches and standards. Last, the growing numbers
and evolving techniques of cyber-attacks from various sources. Continuous investment,
education, training, and learning is required; however, the outcome of such effort is not
promising in a complex environment consisting of both cyber and physical worlds.
7 Recommendations
7.1 Countermeasure redefined
Understanding of issues and identification of challenges would better prepare the airline
industry for developing solutions that would encompass conceptual ideas of objectives and
methods. The word cybersecurity has been used commonly on the internet as a
countermeasure against cyber-attacks and cyber threats. Federal government defined
cybersecurity as: Strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in
cyberspace, and encompasses the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction,
deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies
and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law
enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security
and stability of the global information and communications infrastructure [20]. This
definition manifests every aspect of actions and activities related to cybersecurity which
could apply to the aviation industry on an organizational scale instead of global
infrastructure scale.
7.1.1 Approach
Different activities have a different level of impact on cybersecurity. Proactive activities
such as threat and vulnerability reduction would lead to a direct positive outcome, while the
effect of incident response and recovery policies would not be seen until an incident occurs,
and it improves an organizations' experience. This difference of impact causes
organizations to emphasize policies and activities deemed to be effective based on their
knowledge, skills, resources, risk, and priority.
7.1.2 Holistic
Keanini, Chief Technology Officer of Lancope Inc, network security analytic service
provider owned by American networking hardware company Cisco, said holistic approach
was based on decision-making theory of OODA Loop [21], created by military strategist
and former U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd. The holistic approach is a comprehensive
and continuous process to address cybersecurity by using OODA loop consisting of
observation, orientation, decision, and action. The holistic approach calls for operating
OODA loop at faster pace continuously than threat actors to increase resistance to threat
and raise expenses for threat actors while strengthening cybersecurity. NIST and other
security experts also recognized that this approach would allow an organization to develop
a comprehensive understanding of threats against IS and level of risk [4]; however, they
acknowledged this approach is “costly and time-consuming” (p. 17).
7.1.3 Offensive
Paganini [22] discussed offensive approach involves attribution and retribution; attribution
referred to any effort to hunt for and track threat actors and retribution was retaliating
action following identification of threat actors. He further pointed out attribution was
achieved using a series of aggressive techniques, such as intrusive malware, malicious code,
massive-area wiretapping, monitoring, and spying, and that organization damaged or
monitored threat actors’ system using guaranteed sophisticated methods like zero-day
vulnerabilities. This approach, however, came with ethical and legal issues as it threatened
privacy. Spying and monitoring have become so easy through commonly used smartphones
and applications. Remaining unknown to many, companies have been tracking location
history, recording conversations, and monitoring internet usage along with face recognition,
for the purpose claimed to be marketing research [23]. Another concern is offensive
approach would increase the market demand for zero-day vulnerabilities. Fundamentally,
this could encourage hackers and other cyber talents to research, test, and develop more
vulnerabilities and exploits to satisfy the market need. Many exploits have been open-
source and free for use, potentially it increases cyber threat.
7.1.4 Risk based
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [24] developed and updated a risk-
based framework to demonstrate a common process of cybersecurity implementation led by
organization senior executive and top management. The framework consists of five core
elements, four implementation tiers, and profile. Five core elements are to identify, protect,
detect, respond and recover to threats. Implementation tiers, used to describe the level of
preparation, includes partial, risk-informed, repeatable, and adaptive. At last, profile refers
to the level of achievement in terms of established objectives such as current or target
profile. Top managers and senior executives make a cybersecurity profile based on
priorities, risk assessment and decisions, middle-level managers allocate organization
resources to implement the profile. Businesses would adapt to this approach easily.
However, positive outcome relies on senior executive level's skills, experiences, and
expertise to make the right priority and decision once the profile is implemented.
7.2 International movement
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Air Transport Association
(IATA), Airports Council International (ACI), Civil Air Navigation Services Organization
(CANSO), and International Coordination Council of Aerospace Industries Association
(ICCAIA) have been taking join action to address cyber treats in all levels since 2014; Civil
Aviation Cybersecurity Action Plan was signed in effect to align with 27000 series standard
of International Organization for Standardization and NIST, which was the risk-based
approach [25]. Moreover, 39th Session of ICAO Assembly recommended cybersecurity
regulation suggesting best standards and practices [26]. ISO 27000 series have established
requirements, guidelines and general principles to implement the information security
management system (ISMS); specifically, the ISO 27005 has provided guidelines and
process for organization information security risk management to assess, treat, and monitor
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At this point, research found previously mentioned approaches and standard did not provide
effective and specific methodology, except the overall processes and areas of actions
encompassed in the definition of cybersecurity. Looking at the matter from standpoint of
aircraft operating environments and challenges, no best standards or practices is hack-proof.
Best practices of cybersecurity should be systems that organizations periodically and
continuously review every cybersecurity matter to identify, assess, treat, and improve risk
of cyber threats involving effort of executives, managements and employees and adapt to
change so that organizations remain strategically competent in an evolving and complicated
digital environment. Cyber threat, cyberattack, and cybersecurity is not a war between
digital machines, but it is the war between humans. Human resource is the best tool every
organization can have. And the best practice is to reduce, or eliminate threat from insider,
and better equip employees and management with reliable information, effective training,
and efficient resources.
7.4 Management and cybersecurity
Before any regulation is put in effect, aviation service providers (non-federal) set their own
standards and practices of cybersecurity. Though statistics showed low level cyberattacks
with limited impact, risk of catastrophic attacks remained as they were difficult to detect
[26]. Therefore, it is imperative for organization executives to have a holistic and realistic
observation of risk, challenges and assets before establishing cybersecurity program.
Incorporation of cybersecurity program which requires monitoring of employees’ activities
is also a critical challenge for leadership of executives and managements who depend on an
effective team of employees to achieve organizational goal. Efficiency to incorporate
cybersecurity program in aviation organization would further justify whether executives
and managements possess great leadership to influence their employees to accept being
monitored to achieve organizational cybersecurity; most importantly, complying with or
institutionalizing cybersecurity would have direct impact on cybersecurity readiness [27].
Compliance is to put a program into action, and contrarily, institutionalization is to foster
culture, custom and atmosphere of cybersecurity throughout the organization to achieve
maximum level of cybersecurity readiness with all-hand participation. Without
institutionalization of cybersecurity, even the most secured systems would be exposed to
cyber threat induced by humans.
8 Conclusion
Finally, this research found that, beginning its long-term implementation and development,
fundamental shift to advanced technology based NextGen NAS had caused numerous gaps
and introduced a significant amount of impact to the transportation industry, which could
be potentially tragic to aviation security and public safety in the context of cybersecurity.
These gap involves legislation, regulations, industry culture and customer, standards and
policies in governments and agencies from both federal and states, aircraft and parts
manufacturers, suppliers and customers, airline operators, pilots, aircrews, ground personals,
contractors, and other related service providers; and it required aviation industry immediate
actions to shorten the gap before disaster strikes in the NextGen system of systems for air
traffic management. Positive cybersecurity outcome rests on aviation to develop shared
vision, responsibility, intelligence, and resources, to institutionalize standardized circle of
cybersecurity, and to fight cybersecurity as united entity. Four directions of further research
were also identified during this research: effect of regulating minimum cybersecurity
requirement on outcome of incorporating cybersecurity program in private sector, effective
institutionalization of cybersecurity in airlines and airport, effective approach for airlines to
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with limited impact, risk of catastrophic attacks remained as they were difficult to detect
[26]. Therefore, it is imperative for organization executives to have a holistic and realistic
observation of risk, challenges and assets before establishing cybersecurity program.
Incorporation of cybersecurity program which requires monitoring of employees’ activities
is also a critical challenge for leadership of executives and managements who depend on an
effective team of employees to achieve organizational goal. Efficiency to incorporate
cybersecurity program in aviation organization would further justify whether executives
and managements possess great leadership to influence their employees to accept being
monitored to achieve organizational cybersecurity; most importantly, complying with or
institutionalizing cybersecurity would have direct impact on cybersecurity readiness [27].
Compliance is to put a program into action, and contrarily, institutionalization is to foster
culture, custom and atmosphere of cybersecurity throughout the organization to achieve
maximum level of cybersecurity readiness with all-hand participation. Without
institutionalization of cybersecurity, even the most secured systems would be exposed to
cyber threat induced by humans.
8 Conclusion
Finally, this research found that, beginning its long-term implementation and development,
fundamental shift to advanced technology based NextGen NAS had caused numerous gaps
and introduced a significant amount of impact to the transportation industry, which could
be potentially tragic to aviation security and public safety in the context of cybersecurity.
These gap involves legislation, regulations, industry culture and customer, standards and
policies in governments and agencies from both federal and states, aircraft and parts
manufacturers, suppliers and customers, airline operators, pilots, aircrews, ground personals,
contractors, and other related service providers; and it required aviation industry immediate
actions to shorten the gap before disaster strikes in the NextGen system of systems for air
traffic management. Positive cybersecurity outcome rests on aviation to develop shared
vision, responsibility, intelligence, and resources, to institutionalize standardized circle of
cybersecurity, and to fight cybersecurity as united entity. Four directions of further research
were also identified during this research: effect of regulating minimum cybersecurity
requirement on outcome of incorporating cybersecurity program in private sector, effective
institutionalization of cybersecurity in airlines and airport, effective approach for airlines to
ensure integrity and security of avionics and IS on-board aircraft, and individual minimum
level of cybersecurity education and training in terms of assigned role and responsibility.
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